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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case involves an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
Defendant, ZZYZX Management Group. Appellate jurisdiction is conferred by Article Vill
§ 5 of the Utah Constitution, § 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated, and Rule 3 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A notice of appeal was filed with the clerk of the trial
court pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (See Notice of Appeal,
attached hereto as Exhibit "A;" R. 349).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for ZZYZX Management
Group on the ground Neil Hone could not establish the elements of proximate cause of his
injuries?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and. . . [when] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In addition, it is well established that the court, while reviewing
a motion for summary judgment, must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, in this case, the Plaintiff. See Morris v. Farnsworth Motel. 259 P.2d 297
(Utah 1953); Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Salt Lake Citv Corp. v.
James Constructors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Supreme Court held:
Summary Judgment can properly be granted under Rule 56(c) only if "the
pleadings, depositions, and admission on file, together with the Affidavit, if
1

any," which are offered, show without dispute that the party is entitled to
prevail. This condition is obviously not met if the allegations of the plaintiffs
complaint stand in opposition to averments of the Affidavit so that there are
controverted issues of fact. The determination of which are necessary to settle
the rights of the parties. (Emphasis added).
Christensen v. Financial Service Co., 377 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Utah 1963). Summary
judgment is not used to determine facts or weigh testimony or creditability of witness. See
Hill ex rel Fogel v. Grandsent. Inc.. 477 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970); Sandberg v. Kline. 576 P.2d
1291 (Utah 1978); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co.. 627 P.2d 56 (Utah
1981); Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987). "It takes only
one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy
and create an issue of fact," precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). "Because disposition of a case by summary judgment denies the
benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning question of fact, including evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor of the party
opposing the motion." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
"Furthermore, because negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from
the facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges, 'summary judgment is
appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances.'" Nelson By and Through
Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996) (quoting Dwiggins v. Morgan
Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182,183 (Utah 1991)). Negligence "issues become questions of law only
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when the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn from them." Silcox v.
Skaggs Alpha Beta. Inc.. 814 p.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "Likewise the issue of
proximate cause is a question of fact for the jury to determine in all but the clearest cases."
Trujillo v. Utah Dep't Transp.. 986 P.2d 752, 764 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE AT TRIAL
All four elements of negligence were argued on the trial level, and are therefore
preserved for appeal. The deposition of one of ZZYZX's then employee and shift manager
illustrates that ZZYZX had a duty to keep the sidewalk clear of harmful debris. "As each
manager came in for their shift it was part of our daily walk-through to visually inspect the
exterior walkways, pathways for cleanliness and things that might be of harm." (Excerpt
from the deposition of Ryan McMillan, attached hereto as Exhibit U B;" page 9, lines 21-24,
R. 112). The managers had been trained to inspect the sidewalks for hazards. This argument
was raised by the Plaintiff and shows that ZZYZX understood it had a duty to keep the
sidewalk free of hazards. See (R. 204).
ZZYZX breached its duty by either failing to inspect the sidewalk on the day of the
injury or by failing to remove the rocks. The same manager/employee mentioned above
states that it was his responsibility to check the sidewalks on the day of the accident, but that
he does not remember conducting the inspection. (Exhibit "B;" page 12, lines 12-16). As
argued at trial, R. 203-04, ZZYZX had constructive knowledge of rocks on the sidewalk and
therefore breached its duty by not removing the rocks.
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The Plaintiff, Neil Hone, argued in the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment on Neil D. Hone's claims that enough evidence had been
presented to establish that the rocks on the Defendant's sidewalk were the proximate cause
of his fall and subsequent injuries. (R. 205-209). Therefore the issue of proximate cause was
preserved during the trial.
There is no dispute among the parties that Neil fell just before entering ZZYZX's
restaurant. (See R. 14). The amount of damages caused by the injury has not yet been
argued.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves Neil Hone's claim that ZZYZX's negligent maintenance of its rock
landscaping and sidewalks resulted in his slipping and falling on rocks on ZZYZX's
sidewalk. The trial court granted summary judgment for ZZYZX on the grounds that Neil
could not establish that the rocks on the sidewalk were the proximate cause of his fall. Neil
appeals.
Neil asks this court to review and reverse the trial court's ruling on the ZZYZX's
motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Chevy's Fresh Mex "the restaurant" is owned by the ZZYZX Management Group
"ZZYZX." The restaurant has southwestern style architecture and landscaping around the
entrance. (See Entrance Picture, attached hereto as Exhibit "C;" R. 114). Next to the
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sidewalk by the entrance are landscaped areas full of "river rocks" and "pea gravel. (See
Affidavit of Paula Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "D;" ^[14; R. 302; and Exhibit "C;" and
Interstitial Rocks Picture, attached hereto as Exhibit "E;" R. 289). Neil Hone was just about
to enter Chevy's "the restaurant" when he slipped and fell on the sidewalk adjacent to an area
landscaped with rocks. Neil does not remember much of the events during his fall. (Excerpt
from the deposition of Neil Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "F;" page 28, lines 19-23 R.
130). "[He] was up and then [he] was down." (Exhibit "F;" page 28, lines 19-23). Neil
remembers his right foot slipping and states, "it felt like there was something . . . under it."
(Exhibit "F;" page 27, lines 15-17). Neil's wife, Paula Hone, was standing two feet from
Neil when he fell. (Excerpt from the deposition of Paula Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit
"G;" page 11, lines 5-10; R. 106).
Paula described Neil's fall as "[i]t was like he had stumbled on something;' (Exhibit
"G;" page 11, lines 25 and page 12, lines 1-4). Within a couple of minutes of Neil's fall, as
Paula was helping Neil, he mentioned to Paula that he had felt there was something under
his feet when he slipped. (Exhibit "G;" page 18, lines 10-14). Paula began looking around
and noticed small rocks on the sidewalk. (Exhibit "G;" page 15, lines 14-18 and page 18,
lines 15-16.). Paula removed the small rocks from the area where Neil fell by brushing the
rocks aside with her foot "out of concern that others might fall in a manner similar to my
husband." (Exhibit "D;" ^5). Dustin confirmed his mother's testimony in his affidavit. "I
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observed what appeared to be some pea gravel scattered on the sidewalk in the area where
he fell." (Affidavit of Dustin Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "H;" %5; R. 285).
A potential witness, Sara Lynn Howard, stated in her deposition that she saw Neil hit
his head when he fell but did not notice his feet. (R. 119). Sara was an unspecified distance
from Neil and came over after his fall. (R. 119). Sara and her friend went into the restaurant
to have someone call an ambulance. (R. 118). Paula remembers a couple coming out of the
restaurant at approximately the time she observed the rocks on the sidewalk. (Exhibit "G;"
page 18, lines 19-22). It is unclear whether the couple Paula observed were present when
Paula swept the rocks off the sidewalk to prevent someone else's injury.
Ryan McMillan was the senior manager of the restaurant on duty at the time of the
accident, f Excerpt from the deposition of Ryan McMillan, attached hereto as Exhibit "B;"
page 12, lines 10-11; R. 112). Ryan had started his shift approximately an hour and half
before Neil's fall. (Exhibit U B;" page 12, lines 18-19). Ryan stated in his deposition that
"[a]s each manager came in for their shift it was part of our daily walk-through to visually
inspect the exterior walkways, pathways for cleanliness and things that might be of harm."
(Exhibit "B;" page 9, lines 21-24). As the senior manager it was Ryan's job to inspect the
sidewalks. (Exhibit "B;" page 12, lines 12-14). However, Ryan cannot recall having
inspected the sidewalks according to the requirements of company policy. (Exhibit "B;"
page 12, lines 15-16). Ryan entered the premises from the rear not from the front entrance.
(Exhibit "B;" page 9, lines 25 and page 10, lines 1-9).
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Paula returned several times to the premises where Neil fell since his injury. (Exhibit
"D;" 1J9). Paula stated in her affidavit that "[e]ach time I have returned I have observed
rocks, pebbles, and other materials on the walkways." (Exhibit "D;" TflO). Paula has
included pictures that illustrate how common it is for rocks from ZZYZX's landscaping to
be on the sidewalks. (Continuous Rocks Pictures, attached hereto as Exhibit "I;" R. 295,
296). Even the report by the engineering firm that studied the grade of the landscaping
included a picture that showed landscaping rocks present on the sidewalk in the area where
Neil fell. (Included in Exhibit "I;" R. 260).
Neil dislocated both shoulders and compound fractured his left wrist. (Exhibit "F;"
page 30, lines 20-22 and page 35, lines 2-4). Neil has incurred medical bills and was unable
to work for five weeks and Paula was unable to work for two weeks as a result of his fall.
(Exhibit ctF;" page 46, lines 12-15 and page 52, lines 20-23). Neil brought suit to recover
damages for his injuries. Summary judgment was granted for ZZYZX on grounds that Neil
did not establish that the rocks on the sidewalk were the proximate cause of his fall. (See
Memorandum Decision of Trial Court, attached hereto as Exhibit "J;" R. 340). Neil appeals
that decision.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary judgment should not have been granted for ZZYZX. ZZYZX had a duty
to exercise reasonable care in ensuring the safety of its customers on its sidewalks. ZZYZX
breached this duty by creating a permanent hazard on its premises that injured Neil Hone.
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ZZYZX installed rock landscaping adjacent to the sidewalk. The deposition of ZZYZX
senior manager on duty at the time of the injury acknowledged that the sidewalks were
supposed to be inspected at the start of each shift for "things that might be of harm." The
ZZYZX senior manager who had the responsibility to inspect the sidewalks does not
remember having done so when his shift started about an hour and a half before Neil's injury.
ZZYZX was aware, or should have been aware, of the danger that loose rocks on a sidewalk
can be to unsuspecting customers. The affidavits and reasonable inferences establish a
genuine issue of material fact that ZZYZX created a foreseeable and inherently dangerous
permanent hazard by failing to properly inspect the sidewalks around its rock landscaping.
The affidavits and depositions of Neil and his wife Paula and their son Dustin clearly
establish that rocks were present on the sidewalk when Neil fell. Neil felt something under
his right foot before it slipped out from underneath him and he fell. Paula stated that Neil
felt like he had stumbled on something. While Paula was helping Neil on the ground Neil
mentioned that he had felt something under his foot. At that point Paula looked around and
noticed the small rocks on the sidewalk. Dustin noticed the rocks on the ground also. This
testimony presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the rocks were the cause
of the fall.
The affidavits and depositions of Neil, Paula, and Dustin provide a reasonable basis
for the inference that the rocks were the proximate cause of Neil's fall. Summary judgment
is appropriate only if there is no other reasonable conclusion that a jury could reach. Based
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upon the description of how Neil fell, Neil's testimony that he felt something under his feet,
and Paula and Dustin observing the rocks on the sidewalk were he fell, a jury could
reasonably conclude that the rocks did in fact cause Neil to fall. Therefore the trial court's
grant of summary judgment should be reversed on such a factually sensitive issue.
ARGUMENT
"A prima facie case of negligence requires a showing of: (1) a duty of reasonable care
extending to the plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate and actual causation of the
injury; and (4) damages suffered by plaintiff." Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d
598, 600-01 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570,
573 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985))).
I.

ZZYZX HAD A DUTY TO EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE IN THE
MAINTENANCE OF ITS LANDSCAPING AND SIDEWALKS FOR ITS
CUSTOMERS.
The law is clear that a business owner "is charged with the duty to use reasonable care

to maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe condition for his patrons."
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d476,478 (Utah 1996) (citing Preston v. Lamb.
20 Utah 2d. 260,436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1968)). This duty of reasonable care also extends to
a business owner's sidewalks. Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah
1977) ("defendant's employees had met their duty under the circumstance in making the
sidewalk reasonably safe").
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It is undisputed that Neil Hone was ZZYZX's customer. He and his wife Paula and
their son Dustin were preparing to enter Chevy's restaurant "the restaurant" in order to use
coupons they had received when Neil slipped on some rocks and was injured. (Excerpt from
the deposition of Neil Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "F;" page 18, line 25 and page 30,
lines 20-22; R. 130).
ZZYZX clearly had a duty to keep its sidewalks reasonably safe for customers like
Neil. The trial court correctly concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate on the
element of duty.
II.

ZZYZX'S BREACHED ITS DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE THROUGH ITS
MAINTENANCE OF THE ROCK LANDSCAPING ADJACENT TO THE
SIDEWALKS AND CREATED A FORESEEABLE AND INHERENTLY
DANGEROUS SLIP HAZARD.
There are two theories under which a customer can recover after an injury that

resulted from a slip and fall due to a business owner's negligence. Merino v. Albertsons,
Inc.. 1999 UT 14, ^}4, 975 P.2d 467. The first theory applies to temporary hazards and has
two requirements. Id at ]|5. "First, a plaintiff must show that the business owner knew or
should have known of the hazardous condition. Second, a plaintiff must show that the
business owner had enough time to remedy the unsafe condition had the owner exercise
reasonable care, and that the owner failed to do so." Id at f 5. This theory applies in those
cases where the foreign matter on the floor has been created by a customer or person other
than the stores employees.
The second theory applies to permanent hazards. Id at ^[6.
10

Permanent hazards- involve some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such
as: in the structure of a building, or a stairway, etc. or in equipment or
machinery, or its manner of use, which was created or chosen by the defendant
(or his agents), or for which he is responsible. In such circumstances, where
the defendant either created the condition, or is responsible for it, he is deemed
to know of the condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary.
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975).
Permanent hazards include a negligent defendant's "method of operation where it is
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous
condition."

Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc.. 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah App. 1992).

"Foreseeability and inherent danger are key elements of a negligence action under the
[permanent hazard] theory of liability." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476,
479 (Utah 1996). The law clearly establishes liability if a business owner negligently
chooses a method of operation where it is reasonably foreseeable that inherently dangerous
conditions will occur.
A.

The Rocks That Neil Slipped on Were a Permanent Hazard.

Temporary hazards are treated as permanent hazards if they are caused by a permanent
structure.
Although it [involved] a temporary situation in that the fall was on some
vegetable leaves in front of a produce counter, it also [came] within the second
class of cases above referred to. It was pointed out that in [the defendant's]
permanent structure the vegetable racks were slanted in such a way that it
should have been anticipated that leaves would fall on the floor.
Id at 177 (citing Maugeri v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.. 186 Kan. 75,348 P.2d 1022,
1029-30). There is no question that the rocks that Neil slipped upon were transitory in
11

nature. However, there is also no question that the rocks came from the landscaped area
adjacent to the sidewalk. Paula Hone "Paula," the wife of Neil, stated in her affidavit that
she went back to restaurant after Neil's fall and found small rocks interspersed between the
larger rocks in the landscaped areas near were Neil fell. (Affidavit of Paula Hone, attached
hereto as Exhibit "D;" f 14; R. 302). The only reasonable conclusion is that the rocks came
from the landscaped area. And the landscaped area was clearly permanent. ZZYZX asserts
in the answer to an interrogatory that the landscape was not altered for two years before
Neil's injury. (R. 272). The rock landscaping was permanent. Neil's claim is based upon
slipping upon rocks that could realistically only have come from the permanent landscaping.
Neil's fall is clearly analogous to the plaintiffs fall in Maugeri, and therefore the Utah
requirements for a permanent hazard, rather than a temporary hazard, apply.
ZZYZX might argue that there were no rocks present on the sidewalk where Neil fell.
There is abundant evidence that "pea gravel" was on the sidewalk when Neil fell. Neil's
deposition alone infers that rocks must have been present when he fell. Neil remembers his
right foot slipping and stated in his deposition that it "felt like there was something ... under
it." (Excerpt from the deposition of Neil Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "F;" page 27, lines
15-17; R. 130). Neil does not remember any of the events during the fall itself because "[he]
was up and then [he] was down." (Exhibit "F;" page 28, lines 19-23). Neil was in a lot of
pain after dislocating both of his shoulders and compound fracturing his left wrist and did
not look around to see the cause of his fall. (Exhibit "F;" page 30, lines 18-20 and page 32,
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lines 1-6). Neil's deposition by itself infers that there must have been rocks or something
similar on the sidewalk at the time he fell. However, the testimony of Neil's wife Paula, and
their teenage son Dustin clearly establish that rocks were present on the sidewalk where Neil
fell.
Paula had been walking a foot or two from Neil when he fell. (Excerpt from the
deposition of Paula Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "G;" page 11, lines 5-10; R. 106). She
stated in her deposition that "[i]t was like he had stumbled on something" when Neil fell.
(Exhibit "G;" page 11, line 25 and page 12, lines 1-4). Within a couple of minutes of Neil's
fall, as Paula was helping Neil, he mentioned to Paula that he had felt there was something
under his feet when he slipped. (Exhibit "G;" page 18, lines 10-18). Paula began looking
around and noticed small rocks on the sidewalk. (Exhibit "G;" page 15, lines 14-18 and page
18, lines 15-16). Paula removed the small rocks from the area where Neil fell by brushing
the rocks aside with her foot "out of concern that others might fall in a manner similar to my
husband." (Exhibit "D;" |5). Dustin confirmed his mother's testimony in his affidavit. "I
observed what appeared to be some pea gravel scattered on the sidewalk in the area where
he fell." (Affidavit of Dustin Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "H;" P; R. 285).
There is potentially conflicting testimony as to whether there were rocks present when
Neil fell. A potential witness, Sara Lynn Howard "Sara," stated in her deposition that she
saw Neil hit his head when he fell but did not notice his feet. (Excerpt from the deposition
of Sara Lynn Howard, R. 119). Sara was an unspecified distance from Neil and came over
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after his fall. (R. 119). She noted she did not see anything on the ground "except for the
rocks in the landscaping area." (R. 119). Sara's testimony either conflicts with Neil, Paula,
and Dustin's testimony or Paula had already swept the rocks off the sidewalk with her foot
before Sara arrived. The fact that Sara said she did not see anything in the area only means
that she was focused on the injured Neil Hone and did not observe anything.
Paula stated that she observed the rocks and swept them off to prevent injury to other
within two minutes of Neil's fall. (Exhibit uD;"^f5; Exhibit a G;" page 18, lines 15-18). She
also stated in her deposition that by the time she observed the rocks there was a couple who
had come out from the restaurant and an employee. (Exhibit "G;" page 18, lines 19-22).
Sara had a man with her and stated in her deposition that she and her friend went in and had
the restaurant call an ambulance and then waited outside with the Hone's until the ambulance
arrived. (R. 118). It is very possible that Sara and her friend were the couple that Paula
referred to seeing come out of the restaurant. It is unclear from Sara's deposition whether
she looked for what caused Neil to fall before or after going into the restaurant to call an
ambulance. It is possible that Paula noticed the rocks and swept them aside before Sara
returned from the restaurant. Therefore, it is unclear at this point whether there is a conflict
in testimony or not. However, this is a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide.
The testimony of Paul and Neil alone created a fact issue precluding summary judgment.
For the purpose of summary judgment the trial court should have acknowledged the
factual issue that the rocks were present upon the sidewalk for two reasons. First, all
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evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to Neil, the non-moving party. There
is potentially no conflict between the testifying parties. Therefore, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Neil this Court should conclude there is no conflict of testimony
and the rocks were present on the sidewalk. Second, summary judgment cannot be based
upon a disputed fact. If the evidence is viewed to be in conflict then there is a conflict over
a material fact. Given the central importance of the issue of whether rocks were present, for
the purposes of summary judgment, the affidavits and depositions of the non-moving party
establish facts true and this Court should analyze on the basis that the rocks were present of
ZZYZX's sidewalk when Neil fell.
B.

It Was Foreseeable That Rocks from the Landscaping Would Need to Be
Routinely Removed from the Sidewalks to Prevent a Slip Hazard.
1.

Foreseeability is established because ZZYZX was aware of the risk of

someone slipping on the rocks and falling. Ryan McMillan was the senior manager of the
restaurant on duty at the time of the accident. (Excerpt from the deposition of Ryan
McMillan, attached hereto as Exhibit "B;" page 12, lines 10-12; R. 112). Ryan McMillan
stated in his deposition that "[a]s each manager came in for their shift it was part of our daily
walk-through to visually inspect the exterior walkways, pathways for cleanliness and things
that might be of harm." (Exhibit "B;" page 9, lines 21-24). This statement establishes that
the ZZYZX had trained its managers of the risk that someone might slip and fall on the
sidewalks if the sidewalks were not properly maintained. Ryan McMillan's statement
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distinguishes between inspecting for cleanliness and inspecting for "things that might be of
harm."
It is reasonable to infer that rocks on the sidewalk were a source of perceived harm.
There is no dispute that the landscape contained rocks. ZZYZX has supplied pictures that
show the rocky landscape around the sidewalk where Neil fell. (Continuous Rocks Pictures,
attached hereto as Exhibit "I;" R. 260). Neil has supplied pictures illustrating the thousands
of little rocks, "pea gravel" that lie between the larger rocks adjacent to the sidewalk where
Neil fell. (Interstitial Rocks Picture, attached hereto as Exhibit "E;" R. 289). There is no
question that there are a multitude of rocks in the area where Neil's injury occurred.
Realistically, there are only two main sources of harm on ZZYZX 's sidewalk: debris
dropped from customers and rocks from the landscaping winding up on the sidewalk. It
would be very difficult to construe Ryan McMillan's knowledge that managers were
supposed to inspect for "things that might be of harm" to only being limited to garbage
dropped by customers. Given that difficulty, the evidence indicates that ZZYZX's was aware
that customers might slip and fall on rocks from the landscaping if the sidewalk was not
periodically maintained and establishes foreseeability. At a bare minimum, it can be
postulated that reasonable minds could differ as to whether ZZYZX was aware of the risk
of slipping from pea gravel or rocks on the sidewalk and therefore foreseeability is a question
for the jury. However, the most reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that ZZYZX was
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aware of the risk of customers slipping on pea gravel or rocks on the sidewalk. Therefore,
reasonable foreseeability is established.
2.

Reasonable foreseeability is established even if ZZYZX did not have

actual knowledge of the risk, because ZZYZX had constructive knowledge of the risk.
Common sense dictates that as a matter of course some of the rocks and pea gravel used in
landscaping will wind up on an adjacent side walk. It does not matter whether the rocks were
moved by children or employees or any other unknown cause. Human traffic along a
sidewalk extensively lined with rocks and gravel will naturally result in some rocks being
scattered upon the sidewalk. Constructive knowledge is established because even if ZZYZX
was not aware of the possibility that rocks from the landscaping could be on the sidewalk,
ZZYZX should have been aware. Based upon this natural inference alone a jury could
reasonably decide that rocks on the sidewalk was a foreseeable event.
3.

Reasonable foreseeability is supported by the fact that rocks continue

to wind up on ZZYZX's sidewalk. The continuing presence of rocks on the sidewalk
supports the inference that ZZYZX's landscaping rocks wind up on the sidewalk as a matter
of course. Neil's wife Paula has returned several times to the premises where Neil fell since
his injury. (Exhibit "D;" ]f9). Paula stated in her affidavit that "[e]ach time I have returned
I have observed rocks, pebbles, and other materials on the walkways." (Exhibit "D;" ]flO).
Paula has included seven pictures that illustrate how common it is for rocks from ZZYZX's
landscaping to be on the sidewalks. (Exhibit "I;" R. 295, 296). Even the report by the
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engineering firm that studied the grade of the landscaping included a picture that showed
landscaping rocks present on the sidewalk in the area where Neil fell. (Exhibit "I;" R. 260).
The affidavit and pictures of Paula and the picture provided by the engineering firm support
the natural inference that the combination of people and rock landscaping will result in rocks
on the sidewalks. There is more than enough grounds for a jury to reasonably conclude that
it is foreseeable that landscaping rocks will wind up on an adjacent sidewalk.
ZZYZX might argue that the affidavit and pictures supplied by Paula as well as the
picture supplied by the engineering firm ZZYZX hired cannot be admitted as evidence
showing the reasonableness of the inference that ZZYZX's landscaping rocks will naturally
wind up on the adjacent sidewalks. The Utah Supreme Court had the opportunity to reject
this type of evidence and chose not. In Merino, 1999 UT 14, ^|7, the plaintiff had slipped and
fallen twice in the defendant's grocery store. The plaintiff hired an investigator who visited
the store nine times over two years, Id The court did not declare the evidence inadmissible.
The court allowed the evidence but determined that the evidence did not "establish a
permanently unsafe condition at the time of either accident" Li
It could be deductively argued that since nine visits did not establish a "permanently
unsafe condition" then the several visits by Paula and the engineering firm does not establish
foreseeability, because foreseeability is an element of permanent hazards. However, the
evidence in the present case is being used for a clearly different reason than the evidence was
used in Merino. The plaintiff in Merino attempted to show a pattern of fruit and vegetable
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debris that established a continuing hazard at the defendant's store. The court noted that
there was "no testimony that the floor was permanently covered with fruit or vegetable
debris" and therefore determined that the evidence did not establish a permanent hazard at
the time of the injury. Id.
The present case is clearly distinguishable. In Merino, fruits and vegetables were
transported by employees across the defendant's floor on probably a daily basis. Customers
were at the defendant's store to buy the fruits and vegetables. If a fruit or vegetable fell on
the floor it was a temporary hazard. The plaintiff tried to use nine visits over two years to
show that the frequency with which fruit and vegetables had been dropped on the floor meant
that the hazard crossed over from a temporary one to a permanent one. The court determined
that this evidence did not establish a permanent hazard at the time of the falls.
In contrast, ZZYZX's landscaping was clearly permanent. ZZYZX asserts in the
answer to an interrogatory that the landscape was not altered for two years before Neil's
injury. (R. 272). Paula's affidavit and pictures in conjunction with the engineering firm's
picture provide evidence that supports the inference that landscaping will naturally tend to
wind up on the sidewalk. This is clearly more than just trying to establish a pattern.
Therefore the affidavit and pictures are admissible and support the natural inference that
rocks from ZZYZX's permanent landscaping will foreseeably wind up on the sidewalk.
However, even if there were no pictures or an affidavit indicating how common it is for
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ZZYZX's landscaping rocks to get on the sidewalk, reasonable foreseeability is still
established by the deposition of ZZYZX's employee and reasonable inference.
4.

The evidence on foreseeability clearly precludes summary judgment.

As noted in the Standard of Review, "[i]t takes only one sworn statement under oath to
dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact/'
precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).
The deposition of ZZYZX's employee clearly evinces that ZZYZX foresaw the hazard that
would result if employees failed to inspect the sidewalks. Common knowledge provides an
inference that rock landscaping will naturally result in rocks winding up on ZZYZX's
sidewalk. The pictures and affidavit provide a further basis beyond common experience for
support of that inference. Neil has supplied more than enough evidence to survive summary
judgment. A jury should decide whether the risk created by loose rocks from the landscaped
areas was reasonably foreseeable. Next, is the element of inherent danger.
C.

ZZYZX's Failure to Follow Company Policy and Appropriately Inspect
the Sidewalks for Landscaping Rocks Created an Inherent Danger to
Customers.
1.

ZZYZX's concern that a customer would be harmed if the sidewalks

were not inspected every shift demonstrates that rocks on the sidewalk were an inherent
danger. Inherent danger can be established by the defendants knowledge of the danger.
Campbell v. Safewav Stores. Inc.. 15 Utah 2d. 113, 115, 388 P.2d 409, 410 (1964), (the
unreasonable risk of harm to a customer from a cardboard box was established by the
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manager who urged his employees to keep the aisle clear of boxes out of safety concerns).
It was established in the previous section that ZZYZX's managers were supposed to inspect
the sidewalks at the start of every shift for "things that might be of harm." Ryan McMillan
stated that he could not recall having inspected the sidewalks on the day of the injury. It was
also established previously that rocks on the sidewalk were likely a large portion of what
ZZYZX considered "things that might be of harm." Therefore, because ZZYZX was aware
of the harm that might occur if someone slipped on landscaping rocks on the sidewalk and
failed to inspect the sidewalks then an inherent danger was established.
2.

A jury could reasonably conclude, even if ZZYZX did not have prior

knowledge of the danger, that slipping and falling on rocks is inherently dangerous. Inherent
danger is determined by the amount of harm that naturally results from an activity. Common
experience teaches that slipping and falling can be dangerous. Additionally, if tripping on
a cardboard box, Campbell qualifies as inherently dangerous then so do rocks on a sidewalk,
because the harm that results from the fall is the same. Therefore a jury could reasonably
conclude that slipping on the rocks on the sidewalk was an inherent danger.
3.

The inherent danger could have been mitigated by management

compliance with the company policy. Company policy required the senior manager at the
beginning of each shift to inspect the sidewalks for "things that might be of harm." (Exhibit
"B;" page 9, lines 21 -24). In his deposition, the senior manager at the time, Ryan McMillan
stated that he could not recall having inspected the sidewalks when his shift began at 3:30.
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(Exhibit "B;" page 12,lines 15-16). The depositions of Neil and Paula both indicate that the
time of the accident was around 5:00 p.m., approximately an hour and a half after the
inspection should have occurred. (Exhibit "F;" page 22, line 15; Exhibit UG;" page 8, lines
22-25). It is highly likely that if the sidewalks had been properly inspected according to
company policy that the rocks would have been removed from the sidewalk and Neil would
not have been injured.
4.

The evidence that landscaping rocks on a ZZYZX's sidewalk was

clearly inherently dangerous precludes summary judgment. ZZYZX's awareness that if the
sidewalk was not maintained by routine inspection illustrates that rocks on a sidewalk are an
inherent danger. There is no question that the rocks must have come from the permanent
landscaping adjacent to the sidewalk. Common sense dictates that rocks on a side walk can
be a trip hazard and represent an inlierent danger. ZZYZX's manager responsible for
inspecting the sidewalks before Neil's arrival cannot recall having conducted the inspection.
A proper inspection would have facilitated removal of the hazardous rocks and could have
prevented Neil's injury. At a bare minimum, it is a question for the jury to decide if the rocks
represented an inlierent danger and whether or not ZZYZX should have conducted an
inspection according to company policy.
There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there were rocks present on the
sidewalk when Neil fell. The permanent rock landscaping created a permanent risk of
customers slipping on landscaping rocks that naturally end up on the adjacent sidewalks. It
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was clearly foreseeable that if ZZYZX did not keep the landscaping rocks off of the sidewalk
that a customer might slip and fall and be seriously injured. The failure to follow company
policy and properly inspect the sidewalks created an inherent danger to customers. At a bare
minimum, enough evidence has been presented to survive summary judgment. The trial
court correctly concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate for the element of
breach of duty.
III.

THERE IS ENOUGH EVIDENCE THAT THE ROCKS ON THE SIDEWALK
WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF NEIL'S INJURIES TO PRECLUDE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The trial court concluded that "[n]o evidence has been presented that the rocks were

the cause of the fair' and summary judgment for ZZYZX was granted. (Memorandum
Decision of Trial Court, attached hereto as Exhibit "J;" R. 340). There is substantial
evidence that the rocks caused Neil's fall and therefore summary judgment should not have
been granted.
A*

NeiPs Evidence That the Rocks Caused His Fall Is Not Speculative and
Therefore a Jury Decides Whether Proximate Cause Has Been
Established.

In determining proximate cause, unless the evidence is speculative, a jury decides
whether a cause is proximate or not. Utah law is that "[s]ome or all of the links [of
proximate cause] may depend upon inferences." Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah
44, 132 P.2d 680, 682 (1943). "Furthermore, because negligence cases often require the
drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges,
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'summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances.'55
Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568,571 (Utah 1996) (quoting
Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182,183 (Utah 1991)). However, if "the proximate
cause of the injury is left to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter of law." Sumsion,
132 P.2d at 683 (quoting Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80, 84
(1917)). When causation "remains one ofpure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities
are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the
defendant." Nelson By and Through Stuckman, 919 P.2d at 574 (citing W. Page Keeton et
al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, at 265 (5th ed. 1984), quoted in Weber v.
Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Utah 1986)). Proximate cause can clearly be
established by inference but speculation will not survive summary judgment. Inference and
speculation have been specifically defined.
"An inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact which human experience
teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other facts." State v. Hester,
3 P.3d 725, 730 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Manchester v. Dugan, 247 A.2d 827, 829
(Me. 1968)). "Speculation is defined as the 'act or practice of theorizing about matters over
which there is no certain knowledge.'" Id (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1407 (7th ed.
1999)). "In reality, there is no black line between inference and speculation - both are waystations along a continuum that has absolute certainty at one extreme and complete
impossibility at the other." Id Utah case law has placed markers along the inference-
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speculation continuum that differentiates inference and speculation. The negligence cases
cited do not necessarily deal specifically with inferences to proximate cause but illustrate the
differences between an inference and speculation.
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc.. 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), illustrates that
inferential evidence can be obtained primarily from a witness, and that the evidence does not
have to be observed prior to the accident. The case also provides a factual comparison for
acceptable inferences. The plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment in her slip and
fall case claiming there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the store was
responsible for the water on the floor that caused her fall. Id at 624.
The facts are that the plaintiff slipped and fell on the floor of a dry goods aisle in the
defendant's store, Id Neither the plaintiff nor the friend with her saw anything prior to the
plaintiffs fall that would have caused the accident. Id However, when the friend went to
help the plaintiff up she noticed the floor was wet. Id The friend later noticed after the
plaintiff had been removed from the area that a cart used to transport stock items was located
approximately 115 feet away and contained bags of melting ice. Id The cart was not of the
type used by customers and there was spots of water leading from the cart to the place were
the plaintiff fell. Id The court determined that "[a]n inference could be readily drawn by
the jury that the water in which plaintiff fell came from the bags of ice on the cart left in the
aisle by store employees." Id at 624-25. The court noted that it was for a jury to decide,
even if only based upon an inference, whether a store employee moved the stock cart and was
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therefore responsible for the injury or a "phantom shopper." Id at 625. Therefore, the lower
court's grant of summary judgment was reversed. Id.
Silcox illustrates that inferential evidence can be obtained from a witness to a slip and
fall rather than from the plaintiff directly. 814 P.2d at 624. This Court reversed summary
judgment relying almost solely upon the deposition and affidavit of the friend of the plaintiff.
Id. The friend of the plaintiff noticed the wetness, the trail of puddles, and the cart with the
bags of melting ice fall. Id The only evidence the court relied upon from the plaintiff was
that she did not see anything on the floor before she fell. Id Therefore, direct and inferential
evidence does not have to be supplied by the Plaintiff but can be supplied by witnesses.
The second insight from Silcox is that inferential evidence about the cause of a fall
does not have to be identified before the fall occurs. The friend of the plaintiff did not notice
the floor was wet until she reached down to assist the plaintiff and the cart was not even
noticed until after the plaintiff had been removed from the scene. Id Even though time is
very important when the critical evidence is ice, this court concluded that the evidence
discovered after the fall should not be denied from a jury. Id at 624 & 625.
Silcox also provides a reference point for what evidence is a reasonable inference and
what is speculative. Based upon the fact that the cart containing the leaking ice was the type
customarily used by employees rather than the type typically used by customers, this court
reasoned that a jury could "readily" conclude that the cart was left in the aisle by store
employees rather than by someone else. Id at 625. It is also noteworthy that the court
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accepted as a matter of course the inference that the water caused the plaintiff to fall when
there was no direct evidence by the plaintiff that the water caused her fall. Id at 624.
However, apparently that particular issue was not in dispute.
Nelson By and Through Stuckman demonstrates that the existence of alternative
theories of causation does not preclude presenting the evidence to the jury and also provides
a model for acceptable inferences. In that case, a mother appealed summary judgment for
the defendants in a suit on behalf of her four-year-old son against Salt Lake City and the
State of Utah. 919 P.2d at 570. The mother claimed that either the city or the state was
negligent in its failure to repair a breach in the four-foot fence around a park and that the
breach in the fence was the proximate cause of her son's injury in the Jordan River. Id at
570-71.
The facts show there were no witnesses that saw the boy pass through the breach in
the fence to gain access to the river. l± at 574. The defendants claimed the boy could have
climbed the four-foot fence or gained access through some other opening in the fence. Id
Despite the other possibilities and the lack of direct evidence, the court noted that "other
evidence may be sufficient for a jury to find that it was 'more likely than not5 that [the boy]
entered through the breach in the fence." Id The court never explained what the "other
evidence" was.
The court concluded that the determination of whether the breach in the fence was the
proximate cause of the boy's injuries is a factual determination "appropriately left to the
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jury" and the grant of summary judgment should be reversed. Id The Supreme Court
decided that even though the boy could have climbed the four-foot fence or gained access
to river by some other opening there was enough "other evidence" that a jury could
reasonably conclude that more likely than not the boy entered the river through the breach.
Nelson By and Through Stuckman, 919 P.2d at 574. Clearly, alternative theories do not
preclude sending the options to a jury.
In Campbell v. Safewav Stores. Inc., 15 Utah2d. 113,114,388 P.2d409,409 (1964),
the plaintiff tripped over an empty cardboard box. The plaintiff appealed the trial court's
grant of the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id The box was
six inches tall, a foot wide, and a foot and a half long. Id at 115, 338 P.2d at 410. Canned
goods normally come in that type of box and then clerks remove the cans from the box and
place them upon the shelves. kL The jury could infer and "reasonably believe that there was
a greater probability that store employees left the box where it was than that a customer or
stranger did." Id, 338 P.2d at 410-11. Therefore, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict
was set aside. Id at 117, 338 P.2d at 412.
Campbell provides a reference point for reasonable inferences. The Supreme Court
held that a jury could reasonably conclude that there was a greater possibility that the canned
goods box was left in the aisle by an employee rather than a customer. Campbell 15 Utah
2d. at 115, 388 P.2d at 410-11.
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Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn. Inc., 775 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) provides a
gauge for when evidence falls within the range of speculation. The plaintiff slipped and fell
just inside the entrance of a mall and appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendant. Id. at 445. The plaintiff did not know what caused her to fall. IcL at 447.
The plaintiff stated the floor was "nice, shiny, [and] clean" and was not wet. Id The
plaintiff did not examine the floor after the accident, and no one with the plaintiff ever
suggested to the plaintiff a reason for her fall. Id The plaintiff did not step on a "pebble or
a grape or anything like that on the floor." IcL Therefore, the court concluded that the
plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of material fact. LI
The Dybowski court stated there was "nothing in the record" to support a negligence
claim. Id at 446. The above mentioned facts were taken from the plaintiffs deposition and
illustrated the lack of evidence. ]d at 446-447. Clearly, a claim is speculative if there is no
basis for which it is conceivable to construe the elements of negligence.
Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co.. 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 477 (1955), also provides a
benchmark for speculation. The plaintiff slipped on water in a restaurant and appealed the
equivalent of a grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Id at 364-365, 284 P.2d 478.
A waitress had brought the plaintiff water, but there was no evidence to indicate whether the
water had been spilled by the waitress, the plaintiff or her companion, or some other patron.
Id. "Under such circumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to speculate." Id Therefore,
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evidence is speculative if there is no way a jury could conclude which of the several
possibilities was more likely than the others.
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith. Inc.. 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943), also provides a
reference for when evidence is speculative. The plaintiff sued the tow-truck driver who was
pulling his car claiming the defendant's failure to signal with his arm before pulling into the
flow of traffic proximately caused a coal truck to rear-end the defendant and cause
substantial damage to the plaintiffs car. Id at 682. The plaintiff appealed the trial court's
grant of non-suit. IdL
The facts are that the tow truck entered traffic from the parking lane at a "very gradual
angle and at a very slow speed." Id at 683. The tow truck had traveled thirty-five to forty
feet when the coal truck struck the plaintiffs towed vehicle. Id The only eye witness states
that when the coal truck was twenty to thirty feet from the plaintiffs towed car that the coal
truck swerved and then skidded on the icy road into the plaintiffs car. Id at 682. The court
notes that by this point the tow truck would only have been two feet into the lane of traffic.
Id at 683.
The plaintiff urged that the coal truck skidded because the coal truck driver had not
seen that the tow truck had pulled out in front of it and that the defendant's failure to signal
was the cause of the other driver's lack of notice. Id The court noted that if the coal truck
driver had not seen the tow truck he likely would not have seen an arm signal Id The court
noted other possibilities were that the coal truck driver did see the tow tmck but proceeded
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anyway or went into a skid because of other traffic conditions unrelated to the tow truck. Id
The court concluded that because the other possible explanations for the accident were either
equal or greater in probability than the explanation alleged by the plaintiffs that proximate
cause had not been established. Id
It is important to note that critical to the court's decision was the failure by the
plaintiffs to inspect the accident site for any tracks, markings, or other observations that
might have clarified the cause of the coal truck's skid. Id at 682. The court adds that the
witness was never questioned as to what he thought the cause of the skid was, and no
attempts were made to refute alternative explanations. Id Therefore there was only "very
meager" evidence relating to proximate cause. Id
The lack of evidence relating to proximate cause should not be construed as the court
placing a high standard on evidence that qualified to go to the jury. Based upon the affidavit
of the plaintiffs wife that the tow truck driver's window was rolled up and that she did not
see him signal, the court noted that there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the
question of whether the defendant ever signaled. Id This comports with the inference case
law cited above that if a jury could conclude from conflicting testimony that a fact was more
likely than not true then it was properly submitted to the jury. Therefore, Sumsion illustrates
similarly to Lindsay that if causation theories are at best equal in probability then the
evidence is only speculative.
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Summarizing the guidelines gleaned from the case law, Silcox provides that
inferential evidence can be obtained primarily from a witness, and that the evidence does not
have to be observed prior to the accident. Nelson By and Through Stuckman and Campbell
illustrate that an inference is valid even if there are competing theories of causation. Lindsay
and Sumsion point out that an inference is only speculation if at best it is equal in probability
to the other theories of causation. Dybowski indicates that evidence is speculative if there
is an utter lack of basis for determining causation.
In the present matter, it is reasonably inferred that the rocks on ZZYZX's sidewalk
caused Neil to fall and sustain injuries and therefore the grant of summary judgment should
be reversed. First, is an application of the rules illustrated by the case law for differentiating
between inference and speculation and then second a comparison between the facts of the
present case with the facts of the cited cases.
First is a comparison between Silcox and the present matter. Paula declared that she
believed the rocks were the cause of Neil's fall. (Excerpt from the deposition of Paula Hone,
attached hereto as Exhibit "G;" page 15, lines 14-18; R. 106). She stated that from the way
that he fell she thought "he had stumbled on something." (Exhibit UG;" page 11, line 25 and
page 12, lines 1 -4). Paula was told by Neil while he was laying on the ground that he had felt
something under his feet when he fell. (Exhibit "G;" page 18, lines 10-14). Within two
minutes of Neil's fall, Paula looked around for what he had fallen on and noticed the small
rocks. (Exhibit "G;" page 18, lines 15-18 and page 15, lines 14-18). The witness in Silcox
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did not observe the water on the floor until after the plaintiff had fallen and the trail of
puddles and the cart with the melting ice were not observed until after the plaintiff had been
removed from the area.
The Defendant has asserted that Paula's testimony is speculative because Paula did
not see the rocks before Neil fell and because Paula did not see Neil's feet actually slipping
on the rocks. (R. 138). Silcox clearly demonstrate that a witness's testimony is not
speculative simply because it is based upon facts observed after the accident. Paula's two
minutes is a much shorter time than it took for the witness in Silcox to discover the cart with
the melting ice. This Court determined that the discovery of the trail of puddles and the cart
with the melting ice were facts that should be presented to a jury. Clearly, Paula's discovery
of the rocks after Neil's fall is a fact that should be presented to a jury.
There is an additional comparison to Silcox. Neil did not know while he was falling
what caused him to fall. (Excerpt from the deposition of Neil Hone, attached hereto as
Exhibit "F;" page 28, lines 19-23; R. 130). Similarly, the plaintiff in Silcox did not see the
water before she slipped. Neil stated in his deposition that he felt his right foot slip and it "if
felt like there was something . . . under it." (Exhibit "F;" page 27, lines 15-17). It was not
mentioned in Silcox what the plaintiff felt when she started to slip. It was assumed that if
there was water where she fell that the water was the cause of the fall. Clearly, the presence
of rocks is enough to infer that the rocks are the proximate cause of Neil's fall.
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Dustin also stated in his affidavit that he saw "pea gravel" on the sidewalk where his
father fell. (Affidavit of Dustin Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "H:" p: R. 285). There
were no additional witnesses in Silcox. This further bolsters the argument that a jury should
hear the evidence in this case.
In Nelson By and Through Stuckman. the Supreme Court decided that even though
the boy could have climbed the four-foot fence or gained access to river by some other
opening there was enough "other evidence" that a jury could reasonably conclude that more
likely than not the boy entered the river through the breach. Nelson By and Through
Stuckman, 919 P.2d at 574. Despite the lack of witnesses, the court concluded that the
determination of whether the breach in the fence was the proximate cause of the boy's
injuries is a factual determination "appropriately left to the jury" and the grant of summary
judgment should be reversed. Id The court never explained what the "other evidence," but
apparently it was potentially more reasonable for the boy to have accessed the river via the
breach in the fence rather than by some other means.
There is substantially more evidence connecting the rocks to the cause of Neil's fall
than there was evidence connecting the boy to the breach in the fence. In Nelson By and
Through Stuckman no witness saw how the boy crossed the fence. A jury would have to rely
upon which alternative seemed most realistic for a four-year old. Paula saw her husband fall
like he had stumbled on something. (Exhibit "G;" page 11, line 25 and page 12, lines 1-4).
Paula and Dustin both observed the rocks. (Exhibit "G;" page 15, lines 14-18 and Exhibit
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"H;" «[[5) Neil states he felt something under right foot when he started to fall. (Exhibit "F;"
page 27, lines 15-17). The reasonable explanation is that Neil slipped on the rocks.
Compared to the evidence in Nelson By and Through Stuckman, there is no question that a
jury should decide if the rocks were the proximate cause of the injury and the trial court's
grant of summary judgment should be reversed.
Similarly, a comparison to Campbell illustrates that there is no question that summary
judgment should be reversed. The critical piece of evidence in Campbell was that the box
that the plaintiff tripped on was a kind normally moved by store employees when stocking
the shelves. Based upon that evidence the Utah Supreme Court decided that a reasonable
jury could conclude that it was more likely the box was left by an employee rather than a
customer. In the present case Neil unknowingly stepped upon rocks and then slipped. It is
very reasonable that a person who steps on rocks and then falls slipped because of the rocks.
The probability that the rocks caused Neil's fall is greater than the probability that an
employee left the cardboard box in the aisle of Campbell. If the Utah Supreme Court left
Campbell in the hands of the jury, then the question of proximate cause in this case should
clearly be decided by a jury.
It could be argued that there are alternative theories of equal probability that preclude
sending this case to the jury. For example, maybe Neil falls down sometimes for no reason
due to his artificial knee and hip. Therefore, Neil could have stepped on the rocks and fallen
not due to the rocks. However, Neil has affirmatively rebutted the alternative theory that he
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fell down due to his artificial hip and knee. Neil was asked in his deposition whether his
artificial hip or knee ever caused him to lose his balance. (Exhibit "F;" page 21, lines 3-5).
Neil responded that they had not. (Exhibit "F;" page 21, lines 6-25). Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Neil, the non-moving party, the alternative theory that Neil fell
because of his artificial joints has been rebutted.
This differentiates the present case from Lindsay. In Lindsay, the plaintiff slipped on
water that could have been spilled by the waitress or by the plaintiff or her companion. There
was no way to determine who had spilled the water, and so it was an unreasonable inference
that the waitress spilled the water and therefore speculative. The question at hand is whether
it can be inferred that Neil fell because he slipped on rocks on the sidewalk or from some
other cause. Paula saw her husband fall like he had stumbled on something. (Exhibit "G;"
page 11, line 25 and page 12, lines 1-4). Paula and Dustin both observed the rocks. (Exhibit
"G;" page 15, lines 14-18 and Exhibit "H;" ]J5). Neil remembers his right foot slipping and
states, "if felt like there was something . . . under it." (Exhibit "F;" page 27, lines 15-17).
Considering the possibilities, no other theory is as plausible as Neil's claim that he slipped
on the rocks. And as discussed above, the chief alternative theory was rebutted in Neil's
deposition. Therefore, Lindsay does not apply to the present matter because a jury could
reasonably conclude that more likely than not the rocks caused Neil to fall.
The ZZYZX has argued that because Neil did not directly assert that the rocks caused
his fall that therefore Dybowski applies and all of the evidence is speculative. However,
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there are substantial differences between the present case and Dybowski. First, the plaintiff
in Dybowski repeatedly answered in her deposition that she did not know what caused her
to fall, and had no basis from which she could infer what caused her fall. Dybowski, 775
P.2d at 447. Second, none of the witnesses knew why the plaintiff in Dybowski had fallen.
Id. Neil noted in his deposition that after he fell he was in a lot of pain and did not look
around to see what caused his fall. (Exhibit "F;" page 30, lines 18-20 and page 32, lines 1-6).
ZZYZX has endeavored to show that Neil's personal lack of direct knowledge at the time he
fell puts him in the same category as Dybowski.
As already discussed above, Neil did feel his right foot slip when he started to fall and
remembers feeling something underneath it. Paula and Dustin both observed rocks on the
sidewalk where Neil fell. Paula believes the rocks caused Neil to fall. Paula saw Neil fall
like he had stumbled on something. Neil's stated to Paula right after the fall that he felt
something under his feet when his right foot slipped. After Neil's comment to her, Paula
began looking around and observed the rocks. The only reasonable explanation is that the
rocks caused Neil to fall. There is clearly a basis for determining causation and therefore
Dybowski does not apply.
The evidence of causation also separates this case from Sumsion. The Sumsion court
determined that the probabilities were at best equal because of the "meager" evidence
regarding causation. The witness in Sumsion was not asked what he thought caused the
accident and no investigations were made to determine how the accident occurred. There is
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clearly substantial evidence that the rocks were the cause of Neil's fall. Paula believes based
upon her observations that the rocks caused Neil's fall. The evidence is nearly undisputable
that the rocks caused Neil's fall.
Neil's case is founded upon solid affidavits, depositions, and reasonable inferences.
Neil's claim that the rocks caused him to slip and fall is not speculative, but is the only
reasonable interpretation of the events. At a bare minimum, the question of proximate cause
is a question for the jury. Summary judgment was not appropriate in this case.
B.

Granting Summary Judgment Would Require Weighing the Evidence.

"It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the creditability
of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of the evidence." Holbrook Co. v.
Adams, 542 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975). Paula concluded after witnessing Neil's fall that the
rocks were the cause of her husband's fall. (Exhibit "D;" page 15, lines 14-18). The only
way summary judgment can be affirmed is if this evidence is disregarded or deemed not
credible. The purpose of summary judgment is "to eliminate the time, trouble, and expense
of trial when upon any view taken of the facts asserted by the party ruled against, he would
not be entitled to prevail. Holbrook Co.. 542 P.2d at 193. Summary judgment should not be
used "to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact." IdL Affirming the
grant of summary judgment for ZZYZX would require weighing the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses and would therefore violate the basis for a grant of summary
judgment.
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IV.

DAMAGES
It is not disputed that Neil was seriously injured as a result of his fall. Neil dislocated

both shoulders and compound fractured his left wrist. (Exhibit "F;" page 30, lines 20-22 and
page 35, lines 2-4). Neil has incurred medical bills and was unable to work for five weeks
and Paula was unable to work for two weeks as a result of his fall. (Exhibit "F;" page 46,
lines 12-15 and page 51, lines 20-23). Therefore summary judgment is not appropriate on
the element of damages.
CONCLUSION
The grant of summary judgment by the trial court was erroneous. The Defendant
ZZYZX is liable for creating a permanent hazard. Affidavits and depositions establish that
the permanent rock landscaping adjacent to the sidewalk where the Plaintiff Neil Hone fell
was a reasonably foreseeable hazard that was inherently dangerous if not properly
maintained. The evidence establishes that the only reasonable inference is that Neil slipped
upon rocks on ZZYZX's sidewalk. Every element of Neil's negligence claim has been
buttressed by more than minimal evidence required to preclude summary judgment. Neil
Hone respectfully requests a reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
ZZYZX against his claims.
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DATED and SIGNED t h i s / / ' ^ t i a y of July, 2003.
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.

?•, /^J^e*
M. Dayle Jeffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the original Appellant's Brief was hand delivered to the Clerk of
the Court, in the Utah Court of Appeals and a copy mailed to the below named parties by
placing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this //
addressed as follows:
Scott W. Christensen
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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"clay of July, 2003,

ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an addendum
is included herewith.
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EXHIBIT "A"

4 r " DiSTRlCC CL ..V:
STATE 0 UTAH
UTAH

r

~

M. DAYLE JEFFS, #G1655
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A. HONE,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ZZXYZ MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company, dba CHEVY'S
FRESH MEX, and JOHN DOES I
THROUGH V,
Civil No. 010401654
Division No. 7

Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, Neil D. Hone, by and through counsel
of record, M. Dayle Jeffs, of the law firm of Jeffs & Jeffs, P.C, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court
the final Order granting Defendant, ZZYXZ Management Group's Motion for Summary Judgment
and dismissal of the action by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen entered in this matter on the 6th day
of January 2003. This appeal is taken from the entire judgment,
DATED and SIGNED this j ^ T d a y of January, 2003.
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A.
HONE,
Plaintiffs,

]
I

Deposition of:

]

RYAN MCMILLAN

vs.
ZZXYZ MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C.,
a Utah limited liability
company, dba CHEVY'S FRESH
MEX, and JOHN DOES I through
V,
)

Case No. 010401654

Defendant.

October 25, 2001 - 9:00 a.m.
Location:

PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
Attorneys at Law
136 E. South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Reporter: LANETTE SHINDURLING, RPR, CRR
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah

Court, LLC

THE REPORTING GROUP

11
50 S o u t h Main, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

Ryan McMillan

* October 25, 2001

9

building at that time?
A.

The exterior seemed new and everything seemed

in order when ,1 had got there.
Q.

Was the landscaping all in?

A.

The landscaping was completed except for some

grass that hadn't''been planted on the north side of the
building.
Q.

Do you recall during the period of January of

2000 who was responsible for maintenance duties in the
building, inside the building?
A.

Inside the building?

As far as what type of

maintenance?
Q.

Floor maintenance, etc.

A.

During each of the shifts it was the

responsibility of the respective parties.

If it was in

the kitchen the cooks would be responsible for keeping
the floors cleaned and in order and in the dining room
area it was the busser's responsibility to do the same.
Q.

What about the exterior maintenance of the

grounds, sidewalks, so forth?
A.

As each manager came in for their shift it was

part of our daily walk-through to visually inspect the
exterior walkways, pathways for cleanliness and things
that might be of harm.
Qr

Just general order.

Did they have parking places for employees

Ryan McMillan

*

October 25, 2001

10

separate from the clientele?
A.

Yes, we did.

We were told we had to park in

the rear of the building.
Q.

So that if you were coming on shift, you would

park in the rear of the building and then approach the
entry of the building from the rear?
A;

Most oftentimes we would go in the rear of the

building and then get settled and then walk around and
do those inspections.
Q.

At the time of January 17th of 2000, what were

your specific responsibilities at that Chevy's?
A.

ThB^pn^cningl n^d-^p.ened^^he^res^raur^nr^-~a-t

.roughly—8-rtro~"arrrrrr

I was the kitchen manager for the day

so I didn't have much to do with any of the guests.

I

was in charge of the cooks, making sure the food was
prepared and that sort of thing.

So as far as

clientele, I really didn't do much with the clientele
that day.
Q.

And you say you were the kitchen manager?

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q.

Now, how many cooks would they have there on

that morning shift?
A.

That morning shift, four, and a busser, I

believe, because it was a Sunday, if I recall correctly.
Q.

And four cooks.

Do you recall who they were

Ryan McMillan

1

Q.

2

A,

(BY M R . JEFFS)

*

October 25, 2001
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Yes, I do.

H i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w e r e to m a k e s u r e

that

3

t h e g u e s t r e l a t i o n s were t h e r e , that p e o p ] e w e r e

4

s e r v e d in a p r o m p t and c u s t o m e r s e r v i c e , a h a p p y m a n n e r ,

5

a f r i e n d l y m a n n e r , that a l l tl le s e r v e r s h a d s h o w n i :i p in

6

uniform,

7

flowing.

P

I

and, that <the g e n e r a l o p e r a t i o n s of it w a s

Q.

W h o w o u l d h a v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o v e r t h e t w o of

1^ I y o u at that
A.
11

management

12
13

Q.

getting

point?

I w a s t h e s e n i o r m e m b e r of t h e C h e v y f s
team t h e r e that d a y .
W h o w o u l d have h a d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p o l i c e

the area outside, check it?

14

A.

Me .

15

Q.

And do you recall doing so?

16

A.

That morni-ng I don't

17

Q.

What shift h o u r s d i d y o u h a v e ?

18

A.

That d a y m y shift r a n from r o u g h l y 8:00 in t h e

19
)
21
22
23
24
25

dMm^

recall.

t/:oop.r*.

.

p o i s i n g u n t i l u s u a l l y a r o u n d 4-r-e-fr i*3~~the dfTgrrroon.
Q.

A n d tl len a n o t h e r shift w o u l d 1: .ake o v e r ?

A.

Yes.

A night m a n a g e r w o u l d c o m e o n a n d

r e l i e v e rue of d u t y .
Q.

W e r e y o u there at the time that t h e a c c i d e n t

tl lat: N e i l H o n e h a d took p l a c e ?
A,

Yes, I was.
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EXHIBr

M. DAYLE JEFFS, #G1655
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A. HONE,
AFFIDAVIT OF PAULA A. HONE
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ZZXYZ MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company, dba CHEVY'S
FRESH MEX, and JOHN DOES I
THROUGH V,
Civil No. 010401654
Division No. 7

Defendants.

STATE OF U T A H

)
:SS

COUNTY OF UTAH )
Paula A. Hone, being first duly sworn upon her oath deposes and says as follows:

Restaur

1.

I have first hand knowledge ai

2.

I witnessed by husband, Neil D. Hone, fall near the entrance of Chevy's Fresh Mex
h on January 17, 2000.

- - • .• •>•(.

..

i ng facts.

3.

At the time my husband fell, I was walking at his side.

4.

Immediately after my husband fell, I noticed small rocks on the ground in the same

area where he had fallen.
5.

Immediately after my husband fell, I removed the small rocks from the area where

my husband fell by brushing the rocks aside with my foot.
6.

1 brushed the small rocks aside with my foot out of concern that others might fall in

a manner similar to my husband.
7.

Al a later date, I returned to the area where my husband fell and observed that small

rocks of the same type I saw on the day my husband fell were scattered across the area where my
husband fell.
8.

I gathered some of these rocks; a photograph of these rocks is attached to this

affidavit as exhibit " 1 . " The rocks photographed in exhibit " 1 " are the exact type of rock I saw on
the ground at tlle time and place that my husband fell.
9.

I have returned to the premises several times since January 17, 2000.

10.

Each time I have returned I have observed rocks, pebbles, and other materials on the

walkways
11.

Attached as Exhibit "2" are pictures showing rocks and pebbles.

12.

Exhibit "3" are pictures showing a pile of ro =«.:; u.jacent to the walkways.

13.

Exhibit "4" are pictures of a pile of landscaping material next to the walkway.

2

14.

Exhibit "5" are pictures of the planted areas showing interspersed small rocks in the

area near where Neil fell.
15.

Exhibit "6" are pictures showing materials extending fn •

\; • > .1 areas onto the

walkway.
16

On each of the several times I have been on the site, there has been materials on the

walkway showing a pattern of failing to keep the area free of materials 1 lazardoi is to people on the
walkway.
DATED and SIGNED this /

^*
day of August, 2002.

^aA^ <\

]^r^

Paula A. Hone
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /

"day of August, 2002

C^-

<W.
KJa^Cf
Notary Public
ggwaroggaaggggggggi
NOTARY PUBUC

M.0AYLE JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo.UWt 84606
toy Commission Expires: 6-1-2004
State of Utah

3
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EXHIBIT "F"

In The Matter Of:
Neil & Paula Hone v.
ZZXYZ Management Group

Neil D. Hone
October 26, 2001

Rocky Mountain Reporting Service, Inc.
Certified Shorthand Reporters
10 Exchange Place
528 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 531-0256
FAX: (801) 531-0263
Original File HONEMR.PRT 56 Pages
Min-U-Script® File ID: 1505384127

Word Index included w i t h t h i s Min4J-Script&

Q.

Did your wife have tc work that day?

A.

Yes, she did.

Q.

I assume that you waized until she got home

from work bef ere you and your son tcok her out -- went out
to get a bite to eat.
A.

Yes.

Q.

What time did she arrive that day, do you

A.

I think she got home about 4:30, maybe a

recall?

little -- a 1 ittle before.
Is that about right?
Q.

I'll be asking her sc --

A.

Okay.

Q.

Had you been to the Chevy's restaurant before

this accident ?
A.

No.

Q.

This was your first time there?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you know whether your son or your wife had

ever been to that restaurant before?
A.

No, they had not.

Q.

Why don't you describe for me -- I assume

that someone suggested that as a reasonable place to go.
A.

We had got - - a t the tailgating party at BYTJ

the Saturday before we had got some coupons and when my sen
18

Q.

I assume both of these preceded the accident.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did either the artificial hip or the

artificial knee result in any problems with stability?

Did

you have any problems with falling or -A.

Nc.

Q.

-- or difficulties?

A>

Nc.

Q.

I guess the reason I'm asking is since this

lawsuit revolves around a fall that you had, had you
suffered other prior falls before this accident that were
serious enough that it required you to get medical care?
A.

Let's see.

I can't think of any at this

Q.

I'm not talking about something where you

time.

might have, you know, simply stumbled and gone to your knee;
I am more concerned about a fall that would have been -- you
suffered some injury and -- not just a scuffed knee or
something like that, but an injury that was significant
enough to you that you felt like it was appropriate to go
see a doctor to be checked out.
A.

Like I say, I can't.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I can't remember any, ycu know.

Q.

All right.
21

1

A.

You know, once in awhile you'll slip on ice,

2

but, I mean, I've --

3

Q.

I'm not concerned about those kinds of falls.

4

As I have tried to explain before, I am talking about

5

something not where you simply lost your balance but where

6

you were injured, you suffered some kind of an injury, at

7

least enough that, you know, you couldn't just put a

8

Band-Aid on it but go see a doctor.

9

A.

Not that Z can recall.

10

Q.

What kind of car were you driving at the time

11

of the accident?

12

A.

It is an Oldsmobile Intrigue.

13

Q.

When you arrived at the restaurant do you

14

recall about what time of day it was?

15

A.

It was a little before 5.

16

Q.

Do you recall what the lighting conditions

17

were like?

18
19

I'm not sure.

A.

It was, you know, dusk.

It wasn't dark.

You

could see.

20

Q.

Was the sun below the horizon, do you recall?

21

A.

I don't recall whether...

22

Q.

Was the weather such that -- what was the

23

weather, do you recall?

24
25

A.

It had been raining basically most of the

day.
22

1

Q.

And if I understand you correctly, you had

2

already gone west on the sidewalk, turned north and gone

3

north on the sidewalk, and had you turned or were you

4

turning to the east when you lost your balance?

5

A.

I had turned.

6

Q.

How close were you to the south edge of that

7

sidewalk when you lost your balance and fell?
I don't recollect.

8

A.

9

or a foot-and- a-half.

I would say maybe a foot

My son was on the -- you know, he

10

wasn't -- kind of to the side of me and a little bit behind

11

me.

12

Q.

So the right side of you?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

What were you wearing by way of footwear at

A.

I had some, oh, dress slip-on shoes.

15

the time?

16
17

I have

got a similar pair on today, in fact.
Q.

Do you typically wear glasses or contact

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Had you taken a step or two, is that what: I

18
19

22

lenses?

understood you to say, before the fall occurred?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Did you see what it was that you fell on?

25

A.

No.

Yes.

Mr. Jeffs:
Q.
fall?

Before the accident?

(By Mr. Christensen)

That caused you to

At the time ycu lost your balance, a: the time you

fell, did you know what caused your fall?
A.

No.

Q.

As you sit here today, can ycu tell me how

the fall occurred?
know, which foot?

In other words, did your foot slip, you
Does that make sense?

I know that's kind

of a hard question, bur, for example, when you slip on ice,
you know, that example that you used before, sometimes you
can tell that, you knew, your foot slipped out to the side
or slipped in front of you, it was your right foot or your
left foot.

Can you provide that kind of detail about the

fall?
A.

I believe it was my right foot and it felt

like there was something, you know, under it, but, like I
say...
Q.

Did your foot move one direction or the other

as you stepped onto the right foot?
A.

It just more likely slid backwards.

I'm not

Q.

This is important enough I don't want you to

sure .

guess, but if the impression that you have, if you have an
impression as to what direction, if any, your foot moved
25 jwhen you fell or when you slipped, I would like to know
27

that.

But if you are just guessing, that probably doesn't

help us a whol.e lot.

With that warning, do you have some

impression or are you just guessing?
A.

It didn't feel like it went to the side.

Q.

As your right foot slipped, what happened

A.

I tried catching my balance and didn't

Q.

Did you have anything in your hands at the

A.

No, I did not.

Q-

What did you do to try to catch your balance?

next?

succeed.

time?
!

You mentioned something about your wife grabbing for you.
A.

Well, she tried grabbing my coat but she

didn't get it
Q.

Okay.

A.

And, you know, just -- evidently I must have

threw my arms some way because I dislocated both shoulders.
Q.

Do you have a memory of what happened in the

fall itself?
A.

Not really.

Q-

I understand that --

A.

I was up and then I was down.

Q.

When you were on the ground did you fall --

I mean...

do ycu know whether you fell face forward or landed on your
28

!

A.

No.

Q.

When ycu were on the ground did you realize

you were injured?
A.

I knew ir.y -- both shoulders were hurting.

Q.

You said you struck your head.

Where did you

scrike your head?
A.

(Indicating.)

Q.

On your forehead?

A.

Yes.

Q.

That's where you -- as I told you,

sometimes - -

well.

A.

Yes, on ~he forehead.

Q.

Sometimes gestures don't come across very

Was it a scrape or an abrasion, something like that,

en your forehe ad?

Were there any marks?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Your head hurt?

A.

I can't recall at that -- I was in so much

pain otherwise
Q.

You mentioned your shoulders hurt and I

understood that you fractured your left wrist, broke your
left wrist in this fall.

A.

Yes.

Q.

I assume that was painful to you also.

i

A.

Yes.

|

I -- I noticed the shoulders more than
30

look around and see what it was that h ad caused you to fall?

A7

No.

Q.

You didn't see anything there that led you to

believe, oh, thac must have been what I tripped on, is that
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Other than your wife an d your son, was there

anyone else ;in the immediate vicinity chat saw your
accident?
A.

I don't believe so but.

Q.

Did anyone else come an a speak to you or see

how you were doing when you were there on the ground?
A.

|

I believe someone that was either leaving or

going into the restaurant went in and chen someone from the
restaurant came out.

I think my wife cold them that she

thought they needed to call the ambula nee.

She noticed the

bones coming out of my...
Q-

Left wrist?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Do you recall speaking with any employee or

individual associated with Chevy's the re at the scene?
A.

Very briefly.

Q.

I assume they came out and said, how are you

I mean.. •

doing, is there anything we can do to help, that sort of
thing.
32

A.

Yes.

Q-

And they were able to -- you said[ you

dislocated both shoulders?
A.

Yes.

Q.

I understood that they were able to get the

;

right shoulder back into its socket withcut any kind of --

\

simply by manipulating it.

Is that your understanding also?

A.

I assume.

I was out.

Q.

They didn't have to make any incisions or do

1

1

anything tc) your shoulder?
A.

No, they didn't have to make any incisions on

either one of the snoulders.
Q.

Had you had any prior problems wi_th your

shoulders, any kind of chronic problems, arthritis, anything
like that?
A.

Pardon?

Q.

Like arthritis, anything like that?

A.

No, not that I...

Q.

Had either shoulder ever been dislocated

A.

No.

Q.

I assume that you hadn't had any fractures of

before?

your wrist either before.
A.

No.

Q.

I would like to take each of the injuries
35

;

Q.

Same question with your s:moulders, right or

i
i

left, are there any activities that you''/e had to abandon

j

because of the problems with your shoulders?
A.

irking in the
Like a lot of times when ;I' m wo:

yard I can't lift stuff.

I have to have my son or Paula

j
|

lift it
Q.

I guess you are able to 1.ift but just not

above a certain weight, is that correct?
A.

(Witness nods head.)

Q.

Is that a yes?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you know how much time from " work you lost

j

as a re suit of this accident?
A.

I believe it was five wee]ks, po ssibly it

might have been a little -- you know, five-and -a-half.
doctor would not let me drive the car fo r five weeks.

The
And

he also said I wouldn't be able to get in the van because I
would be pulling myself with my shoulder
Q.

Okay.

A.

And so...

Q.

Do you recall what your p ay was at the time

of the accident?
weeks.

In other words, you've got f ive to six

What does that equate to dollar- wise?
A.

I'm not sure.

If it was the gross or the

net ~- I could tell you approximately what my net was.
46
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that correct?
A.

Correct, yes.

Q.

Has anyone told you that they saw anything on

that sidewalk on the west side near ~he entrance of Chevy's?
A.

No.

Q.

Have you suffered from any other problems

which you believe were the result of the fall?

That's

really broad and I understand it's broad, but we have talked
about your - - w e have talked about zhe problems with your
wrist and both of your shoulders, the abrasion on your
forehead.

Are there any other problems that you believe ycu

have suffered from or are suffering from that are the result
of the injuries that you received in this accident,
emotional consequences, you know, anything like that?
A.

Well, I know it did put a stress on the two

of us for awhile.
Q.

You and your wife?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Because of what?

A.

Well, she had to take time off work.

I had

my arms -- for two weeks I had both arms strapped to me.
could not use either one of my arms.

I

She had to do

everything, including bathe me, feed me.
Q.

Obviously there were some additional

requirements on her while you were in the healing process.
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A.

Yes.

Q.

While you may not: have an exact figure, can

2
3

you give me an estimate as to how much time you stayed home

4

with him?

5

range?

Is it two weeks, three weeks, something in that

6

A.

Approximately two weeks.

7

Q.

Did you work a full 40-hour week typically?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Was overtime an issue?

10

Was that something

that was required or did they not want you to do it?

11

A.

Only in case of emergencies.

12

Q.

The reason I'm asking is, I am just trying to

13

get a sense for the economic consequences to you of your

14

husband's injuries.

15

quarter an hour for 4 0 hours a week for approximately two

16

weeks.

It sounds like you lost five and a

Is that fair?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Now, I'd like to draw your attention to the

19

date of this accident, January 17th.

That was the day that

20

you were working, even though your husband was off that day,

21

correct?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Do you recall what time you arrived heme that

A.

About 10 to 5.

24
25

day?

EXHIBIT "G"

1

Q.

Now, your husband testified that he was a

2

step or two moving towards the east when he fell.

3

your recollection also?

Is

zhat

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And when your husband -- say just the moment

6

before he fell, where would you position yourself in

7

reference to him?

8

A.

On his left side, maybe one foot behind him.

9

Q.

How far to his lefr?

10

A.

A couple feet.

11

Q.

You weren't holding hands or he didn't have

12

your arm or you didn't have his arm?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Where do you recall your son being?

15

A.

On the right side of him, two, two and a half

16
17

feet back.
Q.

Now, had your son -- if you know, had your

18

son turned -- was he heading eas~bound also when your

19

husband fell?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

What was your first: indication that there was

22

a problem that day?

23

A.

24
25

When he

started leaning forward more tc --

like he was going to fall.
Q.

So was it a sudden movement, like a pitching

forward?
It -//as like he had stumble:d on something like

A.

rocks or something that was underneath h:.3 feet and went to
catch himse If.
Q.

Whe Q he started with this movement that you

just descri bed , what did you do?
A.

I went to grab his arm or ~o --

Q.

Try to steady him?

A.

To steady him.

Q.

Did you miss?

A.

Yes

Q.

Can you describe for me hew his fall

A.

He riad fell forward and h~= tried to catch

occurred?

,himself by put ting his hands out in from : of him and he went
into the wa 11 of the building.
Mr. Christensen:

Dayle, do you have those

photographs that I gave you yesterday?
Mr. Jeffs:
other room.

I do.

I believe they are in the

Do you want me to grab them?
Mr. Christensen:

Do you want to grab those?

I have some bl ack and white photographs, but those are
terrible so I don' t want to inflict those on you.
I just found mine.
Mr. Jeffs:

Oh, okay
12

i
i
j
i

A.

Yes.

i.

Q.

Is that correct?

j

A.

Yes.

|

Q.

Now, did you ever look down at your husband's

!

feet as he was falling to see what had caused his fall?
Mr. Jeffs:

i

You mean while he was falling?

Mr. Christensen:

Yes.

She reached for him and I am wondering, as he

Q.

i

was falling did you see anything that led you to believe

|

that's what he had fallen on?

j

A.

Not ~hat I can think of at this time.

Q.

Let r.e ask you the same question but expand

the time frame.
While you were there, at any time did you see
anything on that sidewalk that led you to believe that you
had seen what caused your husband to fall?

It.

There was some very small rocks that had

gathered around in that area.
Q.

When you say --

A.

Very small rocks.

Q.

Small is kind of tough.

gravel is?

You know what pea

Or maybe that's a bad -- okay.

If you were to

use, say, someone's fingernails as the size, was it the size
of your little fingernail, the size of your thumbnail?
you see what I mean?

Do

Is there some way you could describe
15

1

wrist and said, oh, my goodness, he has broker, his wrist?

2 1

A.

No.

3

Q.

Once ycu initially talked with your husband

4

what did you do then?

5

A.

The guys from the restaurant came out and

6

said that they would dial 911.

7

They brought out a booster seat and something to put

8 I underneath his head and feet.
9

And I went to ihe car and got

a blanket and laid over him.

10
11

They called -he paramedics.

Q.

At any ~ime did you have any discussions with

your husband at the scene of the accident about how the fall

12 I occurred?
13
14

A.

He said that he felt that there was something

under his feet.

15

Q.

Is that when you started looking around?

16

-A.

Yes.

17

Q.

How long was that after the fall?

18

A.

Just a couple minutes.

19

Q.

Were there other people gathered around at

20

that point?

21

A.

22

restaurant.

23 |

Q.

There was a couple that had came out from the

And then at least one employee from the

24 |restaurant?
25

A.

Yes.
18

M.DAYLE JEFFS, #G1655
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878

IN I III MM 11< I II II I Ml l i l l U S T R i n Ml I I HI < (MH\ \\
STATE OF UTAH

NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A. HONE,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT O* DUSTIN 1HOMAS
HONE

vs.
ZZXYZ MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company, dba CHEVY'S
FRESH MEX, and JOHN DOES I
THROUGH V,
Defendants.

Civil No. 010401654
Division No. 7

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH)
Dustin Thomas Hone, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says:
1.
this Affidavit.

I am 17 years of age and was personally present and observed the events set forth in

EXHIBIT "H"

2.

On January 17,2000,1 accompanied my parents to the Chevy's Fresh Mex restaurant

in Orem, Utah.
3.

We arrived past dusk and it had rained. We parked on the opposite side of the

building from the entrance and walked on the walkway around the building.
4.

I was walking about 3 feet behind my parents and they were walking side by side at

a normal pace, not fast.
5.

I saw my father fall and try to catch himself as he fell to the sidewalk. He hit his head

into the wall of the restaurant and then down onto the sidewalk.
6.

We rushed to his side and determined that he appeared to be quite badly hurt and was

unable to get up. A couple came up the outside stairs from the parking lot and stopped briefly where
we were and then went on into the building. Someone came out from the building, but I do not know
who that was.
7.

I went to the car and got a blanket to put on my father while we were waiting for the

ambulance. He was never able to get up off the laying down position.
8.

The ambulance arrived in about five to ten minutes and then they rolled him over onto

a stretcher and took him in the ambulance.
9.

While we were there, I observed what appeared to be some pea gravel scattered on

the sidewalk in the area where he fell.

2

Table 1
RECORDED PRECIPITATION
DATE
STATION
Utah Lake Lehi
Oimstead PH
BYU

January 16,2000
None
None
Trace

January 17,2000
None
Trace
0.05 inches

Based on this recorded climatological data, the "worst case" runoff event was
0.05 inches over a 24-hour period on January 17th. From a comparative
standpoint, this amount of runoff is insignificant (ie, too small to be reflected on
storm event. This is particularly true given the expected infiltration rates of the
soils typical to the area. The soils typical to the site are classified as hydrologic
"Group C". For this type of soil, the expected initial loss due to wetting and
infiltration is 0.75 inches in the first hour and 0.25 inches per hour thereafter. In
other words, the magnitude of storm event recorded on January 17, 2000 would
not result in any runoff per se\

3. Magnitude of Runoff Required to move Rocks onto the Sidewalk: An
inspection of the site revealed only rocks
associated with the planters immediately
adjacent to the entry sidewalk area. These
planters had rocks approximately 6-inches in
average diameter.

Various studies have been
conducted to ascertain the required
riprap (rock) sizing for armoring
stream and drainage channels. The
report entitled "Development of
Riprap Design Criteria by Riprap
Typical Rocks in Planters
Testing in Flumes " prepared by
Colorado State University for the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1987 was consulted for the purposes of
this investigation. That report addresses rock sizing as small as d-50 = 1 inch
Chevy's Report

EXHIBIT "I"

0

QN

^0

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A. HONE,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 010401654
vs.

Date: November 26, 2002

ZZXYZ MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company, dba CHEVY'S
FRESH MEX, and JOHN DOES I through V,

Judge Steven L. Hansen

Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendant's Motions for summary Judgement as to PlaintiflFNeil Hone
and Plaintiff Paula Hone. The Court, having heard oral arguments and considered all relevant
memorandum, now makes the following decision:

Facts
1.

On January 17, 2000, Plaintiffs Neil and Paula Hone arrived with their son, Dustin, at
Chevy's Fresh Mex restaurant in Orem a little before 5:00 p.m.

2.

As the three of them walked to the entrance to the restaurant, Neil noticed some "pea
gravel" on the sidewalk south of the building, but he did not have trouble walking through
that area.

3.

As Neil neared the entrance, he fell. He does not know what caused him to fall. Paula
claims that she saw some "very small rocks" on the sidewalk near the scene of the fall but
has no personal knowledge as to the cause of the fall.
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EXHIBIT "J"

4.

Aside from Paula's claim, no one at or near the scene saw anything on the sidewalk that
could have caused the fall. It had rained that day, but the sidewalks were only damp, and
there were no standing puddles of water.

5.

As a result of the fall, Neil suffered injury to his face, head, left arm, and right shoulder.
Plaintiff Neil Hone seeks medical bills, lost earning capacity, pain, suffering, emotional
and mental distress. Paula Hone seeks loss of consortium.

6.

Prior to submitting this motion, both parties conducted significant discovery of regarding
possible causes of the incident.
Analysis
Summary Judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. U.R.C.P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake
County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). In order to establish a prima facia case for negligence
Utah courts have held that the proponent must show, "(1) a duty of reasonable care extending to
plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate and actual causation of te injury; and (4) damages
suffered by plaintiff." Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598, 600-601 (Utah Ct. App.
1995). To prevail each element must be independently proven.
Duty
It is well accepted in Utah that a business owner owes a duty of care to its invitees to keep
its premises safe and warn of know dangers. Black v. Nelson, 532 P.2d 212 (Utah 1975).
Breach
In cases involving unsafe conditions upon the premises of a business, the Utah Supreme
Court has analyzed facts in two different categories:
The first involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a
slippery substance on the floor and usually where it is not known how it got there.
In this class of cases it is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the
defendant so that liability results therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that
he had knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or
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constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that he
should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it.
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature,
such as: in the structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or
machinery, or its manner of use, which was created or chosen by the defendant (or
his agents), or for which he is responsible. In such circumstances, where the
defendant either created the condition, or is responsible for it, he is deemed to
know of the condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary. Allen v.
Federated airy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975)
The parties have briefed, argued, and conducted considerable discovery regarding this
issue. The Defendants argues that, as a matter of law, they did not breach any duty to keep the
premises safe. They claim that there is no evidence that Chevy's had any knowledge of an unsafe
condition of a temporary nature on the day and time of the accident or that it had sufficient time
to remedy the alleged unsafe condition with the exercise of reasonable care. Chevy's also
conducted considerable discovery regarding the character of the landscape, arguing that the rocks
themselves did not create a permanent unsafe condition.
Plaintiffs present the affidavit of Paula Hone in order to establish that, at the time of the
fall, there was small gravel of the defendants' sidewalk in the area where the fall occurred. They
argue that this creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Defendants were in
breach of their duty of care. Plaintiffs argue that this gravel was not put there by a third party, but
was a permanent unsafe condition created by the character of the landscape, and thus Chevy's
was on notice of the danger.
The Court agrees that the affidavit of Paula Hone presents an issue of fact as to whether
or Chevy's knew or should have know that the rocks were on the sidewalk and an unsafe
condition existed. Thus a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not the gravel was
present, whether that presence created an unsafe condition of a permanent nature, and whether
that presence constituted a breach of the duty of care..
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Causation
The law dictates that when the proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim
fails as a matter of law." Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 132 P.2d 680 (Utah 1943). In
Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), a woman fell for an
unknown reason. AflBrming the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Court of
Appeals said that since the cause was unknown and no "further investigation is apt to reveal the
cause" of Plaintiffs fall, the Plaintiff "failed to raise any material issue of fact beyond a 'bare
contention that [the Defendant] was somehow negligent."
Here Plaintiff Paula Hone only saw the rocks after the fall. No evidence has been
presented that the rocks were the cause of the fall, simply a 'bare contention' made that they
could be the cause. Neil Hone himself does not know what caused him to fall. The Court
therefore concludes that further investigation will not reveal the cause of the fall and thus the
claim fails as a matter of law.
Conclusion
Although there are material issues created by the Affidavit of Paula Hone as to the breach
of Chevy's Fresh Mex to maintain a safe premises for its invitees, Plaintiffs have failed to establish
a showing of proximate cause and thus a prima facia case for negligence, the claims must
therefore fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants entitled to judgement as a matter of
law. The Court hereby grants the Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment as to both Neil
and Paula Hone.

DATED this

10

day of _

,<2002

BY THE COURT

STEVEN L
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